Colorado Justices Recognize Self-Defense Exception to At-Will Firing
The Colorado Supreme Court answered a certified question in the affirmative June 15, holding 5-2 that an at-will employee fired for lawfully exercising the right to self-defense at work may bring a wrongful termination claim. The en banc court returned the case of Mary Ann Moreno, a 72-year-old Circle K clerk, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Chief Justice Márquez, joined by Justice Hood, dissented.
The Colorado Supreme Court held 5-2 on June 15 that an at-will employee fired for lawfully acting in self-defense at work can sue the employer for wrongful termination, recognizing a new public-policy exception to Colorado’s at-will employment doctrine.
The en banc court answered in the affirmative a question of law certified by the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado and returned the case for further proceedings. The decision, 2026 CO 46, No. 25SA134, arose from the firing of Mary Ann Moreno, a 72-year-old Circle K Stores, Inc. clerk who says she was terminated for defending herself against a man who came around her counter carrying knives.
Justice Berkenkotter delivered the opinion, joined by Justices Boatright, Gabriel, Samour and Blanco. Chief Justice Márquez, joined by Justice Hood, dissented.
The certified question asked whether Colorado law recognizes a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring a wrongful termination claim when the employee is terminated for actions taken in self-defense. In plain terms, the issue was whether an employer’s right to fire a worker for any reason stops short of firing someone for lawfully fending off an attack on the job.
According to the opinion, Tyler Wimmer approached Moreno’s register one evening holding several items, including two hunting knives, and placed the knives on the U-shaped counter separating him from Moreno. He told her to get him a pack of cigarettes, and when she began to ring them up he said something to the effect of, “[J]ust give them to me for free.” Moreno refused. Wimmer picked up the knives and started around the counter. Moreno twice told him, “[D]on’t come back here.” When Wimmer came within reach, she extended her arms. In her telling, she did so instinctively to defend herself and keep him from getting closer. Wimmer grabbed a pack of cigarettes, left the store and was arrested for armed robbery. A footnote states he later pleaded guilty to menacing with a deadly weapon.
Circle K terminated Moreno for violating its “Don’t Chase or Confront” policy, which instructs employees not to confront, follow, pursue, track, chase or fight any customer suspected of shoplifting. Moreno sued in state court, Circle K removed the case to federal court, and the district court initially granted summary judgment to the company, reasoning that a federal court was “simply not in the position to recognize, in the first instance, a new type of public-policy exception to Colorado’s at-will employment doctrine.” The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding unresolved factual issues. On remand, the district court found genuine disputes over Moreno’s credibility, the interpretation of the surveillance video and Circle K’s motivation, denied summary judgment, and then certified the legal question to the state supreme court under C.A.R. 21.1.
The majority worked through the four-part test from Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992), the decision that first recognized a public-policy exception in Colorado employment law. Because the third and fourth elements are questions of fact outside the certified question, the court focused on whether self-defense is a clearly expressed right or privilege an employee holds as a worker.
It answered yes on each point. Section 18-1-704, C.R.S., which the court traced to an 1861 territorial statute, sets out by whom, when and how force may be used, giving both employees and employers notice of what is lawful. Article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution guarantees “the right of enjoying and defending their lives,” language the court said is not merely hortatory because decades of case law define its boundaries. Drawing on Martin Marietta’s reasoning that a worker should not have to choose between a job and criminal conduct, the majority wrote: “An employee should never have to choose between their job and their safety.”
On whether the right is public rather than personal, the court distinguished Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997), where rest breaks for a typist were held insufficient, and pointed to a court of appeals decision, Bonidy v. Vail Valley Center for Aesthetic Dentistry, P.C., 186 P.3d 80 (Colo. App. 2008), which found a public policy where denying a dental assistant breaks could endanger patients. Although self-defense is exercised by individuals, the majority said, “its impact is necessarily public.” It cited Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614 (Utah 2015), and Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001), and rejected Circle K’s reliance on Hoven v. Walgreen Co., 751 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2014), noting that Michigan bars constitutional provisions as sources of public policy while Colorado does not.
On the job-related element, the court concluded that “the right to self-defense is job-related insofar as the need to lawfully defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can occur at work,” adding that “[i]t is not a right that is left at the door when a person enters the workplace.” The bottom line: “an employer may not lawfully terminate an employee for properly exercising their essential, inalienable right to self-defense if the employee suffers an unprovoked attack at work.”
The majority stressed limits. “[T]he scope of the exception that we recognize today is narrow,” the opinion states, and it “applies only when an employee lawfully exercises the right in response to an unprovoked attack at work.” A footnote adds, “We cabin our holding today to exercises of self-defense, as the Colorado Constitution only establishes self-defense as an inalienable right.” The court also said its ruling does not mean “that an employer may not place reasonable limitations on these broader, societal rights to maintain the efficiency, safety, and stability of a workplace.” And it expressly declined to decide whether Circle K’s policy bars self-defense or merely bars confronting shoplifters, whether Moreno acted in self-defense, or whether Circle K fired her for doing so.
Chief Justice Márquez’s dissent said the majority “misapplies (and effectively rewrites) our test for public-policy exceptions established in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz.” Reproducing the text of the Circle K policy in full, the dissent said it does not prohibit self-defense but bars pursuing or confronting suspected thieves, and noted Circle K’s argument that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration recommends such de-escalation policies. The dissent recounted Circle K’s version of the surveillance video, in which Moreno stepped toward Wimmer, positioned herself between him and the cigarettes, and grabbed his shirt and sleeve while telling him she would call the police.
The dissent argued that article II, section 3 and section 18-1-704 have no specific connection to employment and constrain government rather than private employers: “I cannot agree that a right stemming from the constitution that limits state action necessarily constrains private employers to the degree that it may serve as an exception to our doctrine of at-will employment.” It raised a series of questions it said the majority’s reasoning leaves open, including defense of third parties, the right to bear arms and the right to protect property under section 18-1-706, and warned that “employers’ inability to enforce such de-escalation policies will undermine workplace safety.” The doctrine, the dissent concluded, has been left in the “unwieldy and unpredictable” place the court warned against in Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Service v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996).
Moreno’s case now returns to the federal district court, where the disputed facts the majority declined to address remain for a jury. She is represented by Virginia Hill Butler, Iris Halpern and Matthew Cron of Rathod Mohamedbhai LLC in Denver.
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